Regional Enforcement Action under the United Nations Charter and Constraints upon States Not Members by McNeill, John H.
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 9
Issue 1 December 1975 Article 1
Regional Enforcement Action under the United
Nations Charter and Constraints upon States Not
Members
John H. McNeill
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
McNeill, John H. (1975) "Regional Enforcement Action under the United Nations Charter and Constraints upon States Not
Members," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 9: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol9/iss1/1
CORNELL
INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL
Volume 9 December 1975 Number 1
Regional Enforcement Action
Under the United Nations
Charter and Constraints
Upon States Not Members
JOHN H. McNEILL*
The maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt has long formed a
norm of classical international law. It is with the former of this rule's
dual proscriptions, applied in the context of regional arrangements and
agencies under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, that this
article is concerned. The article will review international practice under
the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice, examine the United Nations Charter, and discuss relevant interna-
tional practice in an attempt to extract the rules of international law
which govern the obligations and responsibilities of third party States
under enforcement action by regional arrangements.
* Attorney Adviser, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. B.A. 1962,
University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1965, Villanova University; LL.M. 1971, Ph.D. 1974,
London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London; Diploma 1973,
the Hague Academy of International Law. The views expressed in this paper are presented
as solely those of the author and are not necessarily shared by the Government of the
United States of America.
This paper was prepared under the auspices of the Hague Academy of International Law
in conjunction with the 1974 session of the Academy's Centre for Studies and Research in
International Law and International Relations. The author gratefully acknowledges the
encouragement and suggestions of his Centre colleagues in the preparation of this paper,
especially those of Professor Remigiusz Bierzanek of Warsaw University.
Cornell International Law Journal
I
PRACTICE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
During this century, the rule that States cannot be obligated by treat-
ies to which they are not parties has been judicially applied on numerous
occasions, perhaps most significantly by the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice. In its Order of 19 August 1929 in the case of the Free
Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, the Permanent Court
employed the rule when it declared that Switzerland, not a party to the
Treaty of Versailles, was not bound by this treaty except to the extent
it had itself otherwise accepted it.' Similarly, the Permanent Court
found in the case relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Commission of the River Oder that the Barcelona Convention of
20 April 1921, relating to the Regime of Navigable Waterways of Inter-
national Concern, could not be invoked against Poland, a State not a
party to that treaty.2
These conclusions, as well as the first proscription of the pacta tertiis
maxim, are founded upon a principle endorsed by the Permanent Court
in its judgment in the case of the S.S. "Lotus. "I The Permanent Court
therein determined that, since international law governed relations be-
tween independent States on the basis of rules of law which have ema-
nated from the free will of these subjects, restrictions upon the inde-
pendence of such States could not be presumed.'
The pacta tertiis rule was manifestly incorporated by the Covenant
of the League of Nations. Article 17 of the Covenant required that in the
event of a dispute between a League member and a State not a member
of the League, the League must issue an invitation to the nonmember
State to accept the obligations of League membership for the purposes
of settling the dispute.' The nonmember State, however, was free to
1. [1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 22, at 17.
2. [1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 23, at 19-22.
3. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10.
4. Id. at 18.
5. Article 17 of the Covenant stated:
In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which
is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League,
the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the
obligations of Membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon
such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the
provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications
as may be deemed necessary by the Council.
Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an
inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may
seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.
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ignore the League's request. Only when the nonmember resorted to war
against a League member after refusing a request to accept the obliga-
tions of League membership was the League empowered to authorize the
invocation of sanctions under Covenant Article 16 against the nonmem-
ber. Somewhat curiously, Article 17 of the Covenant also provided that
nonmember parties to a dispute wholly among themselves were still
subject to League actions to prevent hostilities, even if they had ignored
invitations to accept the obligations of League membership for purposes
of their dispute. The League never attempted to exercise this power,
however. This rather inconsistent ascription of interest to the League by
its Covenant, empowering it to interfere more broadly in disputes wholly
between nonmembers than in disputes between members and nonmem-
bers, has been found remarkable by some commentators.' But this dis-
parity seems more properly attributed to what appears in retrospect to
have been a refreshingly innocent equation by the framers of the Cove-
nant of the terms "war" and "hostilities."
In the course of its well-known Advisory Opinion concerning the
Status of Eastern Carelia,7 the Permanent Court was obliged to pass
upon a number of these fundamental issues. The question came before
the Court through a reference from the Council of the League. Finland
had alleged that the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, a
nonmember of the League at that time, had failed to observe certain
provisions of the 1920 Treaty and Declaration of Dorpat. Tchitcherin,
Russian People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, advised the Court by
telegram that
... any attempt on the part of any power to apply to Russia the article
of the Covenant of the League relating to disputes between one of its
Members and a non-participating State would be regarded by the Rus-
sian Government as an act of hostility to the Russian State: the Russian
Government categorically refuses to take any part in the examination of
this question by the League of Nations or the Permanent Court.'
If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the
League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member
of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State
taking such action.
If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations
of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may
take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities
and will result in the settlement of the dispute.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 17.
6. See, e.g., R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 194 (1970).
7. [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5.
8. Signed October 14, 1920, 1922 Sbornik dog SSSR I, 17; 3 L.N.T.S. 5.
9. [19231 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5, at 13.
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Accordingly, in the absence of the consent of the States not a member
of the League, the Court decided that it could not take part in the
settlement of the dispute."0 The Court considered Article 17 of the
League Covenant to be an application of the principle of the independ-
ence of States, a fundamental norm of international law, and moreover
recognized what it judged to be an equally well established international
law principle: that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to
submit its disputes to procedures for pacific settlement."
This determination of the Permanent Court has long presented an
obstacle to those who would characterize Covenant Article 17 as the first
breach in the traditionally absolute right of non-participant States to
ignore pleas by others to settle peacefully international disputes by
characterizing pacts such as the League Covenant as res inter alios acta.
For example, it has been suggested that the Court's restrictive interpre-
tation of Article 17 in Eastern Carelia exhausted the Article of its con-
tent and thereby effectively ignored the alternative provisions it con-
tained. 12 This criticism, however, fails to recognize that in the Eastern
Carelia dispute the League was not empowered to intervene under either
customary international law or its own Covenant. 3
II
THE UNITED NATIONS
A. DRAFrING THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
Among the more durable agreements reached during the 1944 Dum-
barton Oaks conversations concerning an envisaged postwar peacekeep-
ing organization was that embodied in the following language:
The Organisation should ensure that states not members of the Organi-
sation act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary
for the maintenance of international peace and security."
This text had been accepted without serious opposition and adopted
nearly verbatim by the 1945 United Nations Conference on Interna-
tional Organization. The only material change made in the above-
quoted language at San Francisco was the subsitution of the mandatory
10. Id.at 28.
11. Id. at 27.
12. FALK, supra note 6, at 198.
13. The first paragraph of Article 17 was clearly applicable to the Eastern Carelia
situation, involving as it did a dispute between a member of the League (Finland) and a
nonmember (Russia). Russia did not resort to war against Finland until many years after
the League invitation was refused. Failing such belligerency, the third paragraph of the
Article was not applicable. For the full text of Article 17 see note 5 supra.
14. Doc. 1, G/I, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 2-3 (1945).
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"shall" in place of the hortatory "should," a textual modification some-
what surprisingly dismissed as "a matter of form, of drafting, rather
than of substance" by the President of Commission I." In this way, the
United Nations imposed an obligation upon itself regarding the regula-
tion of nonmember States insofar as nonmembers might affect the
maintenance of international peace and security.16 Attempting to ex-
plain the vote by which the above text (including both the then-
undesignated alternatives "shall" and "should") was adopted, the Rap-
porteur of Committee I/l/A at the San Francisco Conference said the
organization was entitled to so act because it represented "the major
expression of the international legal community."' 7 Kelsen later de-
scribed this as a "revolutionary" attempt to extend the customary com-
petence of the organization."
The decision to designate this obligation as one of the principles of
the organization was not universally approved, however, and tentative
adoption of the draft text by the Coordination Committee of the Confer-
ence was made expressly subject to a clarification, inter alia, that the
obligation was not properly to be included among the principles of the
United Nations. 9 Moreover, several delegations to the Conference were
apprehensive that any attempt to obligate States not members of the
new organization to act in compliance with the Charter would be con-
trary to customary international law.2"
Belgium proposed an amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks proposal
which would have confronted these objections by incorporating into the
text an explicit declaration that the right of the organization to limit
nonmember States in the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity was based upon an authorized expression of the international legal
community to this effect.' This bold course and other proposed amend-
ments were not favorably received by the Conference. However, the
15. Doc. 1123, 1/8 6 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 83 (1945).
16. See also N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 14 (1950); Bindschedler, Lad~limitation des comp~tences des Nations Unies, 108
RECUEIL DES CouRs 307, 405 (1963).
17. Doc. 810, I/1/30, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 348 (1945).
18. H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 109 (1950).
19. See remarks by the Canadian delegate, Doc. WD 410, CO/170, 17 U.N.C.I.O. Docs.
147 (1945).
20. Id.
21. See submissions by Venezuela, Doc. 2, G/7(d)(1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 193-94 and
remarks by the Uruguayan delegate, Doc. 810,1/1/30, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 348. The Belgian
delegation was of the view that such rectification would be necessary if adverse criticism
of such extended U.N. competence was to be forestalled. To achieve this end, it proposed
that the "moral and legal" basis of the obligation be emphasized in order to achieve a
"less unilateral" posture. Doc. 2, G/7(k)(1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 337 (1945).
22. Doc. 810, I/1/30, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 337 (1945).
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language of the passage which ultimately became Article 2(6) of the
Charter failed to enumerate the legal basis of its authority. This out-
come was attributable to the desire shared by most delegations at the
Conference to render membership in the new organization a status eas-
ily acquired by those States not participating in the United Nations
Conferenbe on International Organization.? The formation of a closed
association of States which would nevertheless assert a legal right to
intervene in the activities of nonmember States was never the intent of
the authors of the United Nations Charter.24
Are nonmember States, as well as the organization, equally obliged
as a matter of law to cooperate with the United Nations in the mainte-
nance of international peace and security by Charter Article 2(6)? Most
international publicists have answered this in the negative, denying that
the Charter obligates nonmember nations to accept United Nations
intervention into their activities for peacekeeping purposes., Indeed,
even the leading proponent of the minority view, the late Professor
Kelsen, acknowledged that Charter Article 2(6) was not in conformity
with the general international law prevailing at the time that the
Charter entered into force.
B. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
The 1969 Viehna Convention on the Law of Treaties endorsed and
adopted the customary norm of international law, expressed in the
pacta tertiis maxim, that treaties impose no obligation on third States.,
The Vienna Convention further provides that no obligation arises for
third States from any treaty provision which is not intended by the
Parties to create such obligation and which is not expressly accepted in
23. See proposals by Uruguay, Doc. 2, G/7(a)(1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 36 (1945) and by
Mexico, Doc. 2, G/7(c)(1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 180 (1945).
24. See Bierzanek, The Principle of Universality and its Realization in the United
Nations (Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, spec. ed.) 28, 30 (1971).
25. See, e.g., BENTWICH & MARTIN, supra note 16, at 14; D. BowETr, THE LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 23 (2d ed. 1970); S. HSUEH, L'ORGANIZATION DES NATIONS UNIES ET
LES t9TATS NONMEMBRES 84 (1953); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
167 (5th ed. 1967); 6 J. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 279 (1973);
Bindschedler, supra note 16, at 404-405; Kunz, Revoluntinary Creation of Norms in Inter-
national Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 119, 125 (1947). But see, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 669 (2d ed. 1973); Kelsen, Membership in the United Nations,
46 COLUM. L. REv. 391, 394 (1946).
26. Kelsen, Sanctions in International Law Under the Charter of the United Nations,
31 IOWA L. REV. 499, 502 (1946).
27. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 39/27, in United
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF.
39/11/Add 2, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 34, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L.
875 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention].
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writing by the third State.2s The practice of States has long embodied
the realism inherent in this norm.2 9 Moreover, no attempt was made
during the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties to in any
way limit this rule as it applied to the constituent instruments of inter-
national organizations; the Convention as a whole, including the princi-
ple here considered, was made applicable to such instruments."
In summary, it is plain that as a matter of both customary and con-
ventional international law States not members of the United Nations
are not bound by the Charter, to them a res inter alios acta, to cooperate
with the organization even in the maintenance of international peace
and security.
C. THE NAMIBIA DISPUTE
Against this background, the Advisory Opinion of the International
Court of Justice concerning the South African presence in Namibia'
must be considered. In a written submission to the Court on this ques-
tion, the Government of Finland maintained the traditional position
that States not members of the United Nations were not bound by the
Charter, citing in support the pacta tertiis rule and the relevant articles
of the 1969 Vienna Convention.2 The Court, however, held that "it is
incumbent upon States which are not Members of the United Nations
to give assistance. . . in the action which has been taken by the United
Nations with regard to Namibia." The question arises, therfore, as to
whether the Court thus acknowledged an exception to the pacta tertiis
rule and declared an obligation for third States under the Charter.
At the core of the Namibia dispute was a question of political jurisdic-
tion, centered on the competence of the General Assembly of the United
Nations to declare the termination of a mandate agreement. The Court
in this instance determined that the illegal presence of South Africia in
28. Id., art. 35. This was precisely the requirement described as necessary before the
Charter could bind third States by Judge Krylov in his dissent to the Advisory Opinion
concerning Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949]
I.C.J. 174, at 218-19.
29. R. ROXBURGH, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND THIRD STATES 29 (1917); Fitz-
maurice, Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties, [1960] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 86, U.N.
Doc. A/CN. 4/130 (1960).
30. Vienna Convention, art. 5. See also T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 61
(1974).
31. Advisory Opinion concerning Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Pres-
ence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16 [hereinafter referred to as Namibia].
32. Written Statement of the Government of Finland, 1 Namibia, I.C.J. Pleadings 375-
76 (1971).
33. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 58.
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Namibia was "opposable to all States in the sense of barring erga omnes
the legality of a situation which is maintained in violation of interna-
tional law . . . ."I' The Court further stated that "in particular, no
State which enters into relations with South Africa concerning Namibia
may expect the United Nations or its Members to recognize the validity
or effects'of such relationship, or of the consequences thereof."3 In other
words, the Court gave notice to third States that in the future they
would be held by the United Nations to deal with the South African
regime in Namibia at their peril; but this is very different from main-
taining that such third States are legally obligated to cooperate with the
implementation of United Nations policy. Similarly, the incumbency
upon States not members of the United Nations to assist the organiza-
tion in regard to its actions concerning Namibia36 was not an obligation
for third States sounding in any norm of customary international law,
but was instead an expression of the organization's international obliga-
tion to its members, under Article 2(6) of the Charter, to attempt to
ensure the compliance of all States with such measures adopted by the
United Nations as are designed to aid in the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security."
The Namibia opinion also addressed the position of third States with
regard to Chapter VII measures directed by the Security Council against
United Nations members. First, the Court set out the factors which
must be considered in determining the legal consequences of a resolution
of the Security Council:
In view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question whether
they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having
regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions
leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circum-
stances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the
resolution of the Security Council.38
The Court then applied this test to several resolutions at issue, holding,
inter alia, that paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)"9
34. Id. at 56.
35. Id.
36. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
37. See D. Nigcid, THz PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE PRACTICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 305 n.20 (1970); see also the 1959 Antarctic Treaty for an analogous
obligation undertaken by its parties, which are obliged to exert appropriate efforts "to the
end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes
of the present Treaty." Antarctic Treaty, signed at Washington, Dec. 1, 1959, art. X,
[1961] 1 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
38. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 53.
39. This paragraph stated in pertinent part:
The Security Council, ...
[Vol. 9:1
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had been adopted in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
Charter and in accordance with Charter Articles 24 and 25 and, conse-
quently, that this decision was "binding on all States Members of the
United Nations." 40
Since, as explored above," the Court did not attempt to declare that
nonmember States were under a legal obligation to cooperate with the
United Nations in forcing South Africa out of Namibia, it necessarily
follows that the language of the opinion was addressed in a deliberately
restrictive manner only to members of the United Nations; to have done
otherwise would have been to contravene the rationale adopted by the
Court. The language of Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), insofar
as it may be considered as addressed to States not members of the
United Nations, is thus purely hortatory and devoid of legal effect.
D. SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTHERN RHODESIA, ACQUIESCENCE AND OPINIO
JURIS
Beginning in 1965, the Security Council adopted a series of resolutions
which resulted in the application and enforcement of sanctions against
Southern Rhodesia. In the first of these, Resolution 216, the Security
Council called upon all States "not to recognize this illegal racist minor-
ity regime in Southern Rhodesia and to refrain from rendering any
assistance to this illegal regime."4 When the Council later adopted more
severe sanctions against Southern Rhodesia it directed the measures to
be imposed only by "all States members of the United Nations," not by
all States, and urged States not members to act in accordance with
sanctions.43 However, on 28 February 1972, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 314, which in pertinent part
[u]rges all States to implement fully all Security Council resolutions
establishing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, in accordance with
their obligations under Article 25 and Article 2, paragraph 6, of the
Recalling Security Council resolution 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969,...
5. Calls upon all States, particularly those which have economic and other inter-
ests in Namibia, to refrain from any dealings with the Government of South
Africa which are inconsistent with paragraph 2 of the present resolution ....
S.C. Res. 276, 25 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. SIINF/25, at 1-2 (1970).
40. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 53.
41. See text following note 35 supra.
42. S.C. Res. 216, 20 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. SJINF/20/Rev. 1, at 8 (1965). S.C. Res.
217, id., further spelled out Council policy toward Southern Rhodesia and also addressed
itself to "all States."
43. See S.C. Ies. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev. 1, at7 (1966); S.C. Res.
253, 23 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev. 1, at 5 (1968). See also S.C. Res. 277, 25
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25, at 5 (1970) and S.C. Res. 288, 25 U.N. SCOR, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/25, at 7 (1970).
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Charter of the United Nations, and deplores the attitude of those States
which have persisted in giving moral, political and economic assistance
to the illegal regime.4
This seemingly broad attempt by the Security Council to establish
"obligations" for States not members under Charter Article 2(6) may at
most be taken to refer to the language of Security Council Resolutions
216 and 217,11 for these are the only resolutions on the Southern Rhode-
sia question to have comprised a decision addressed to States not mem-
bers, and therefore are the only ones which could conceivably provide a
legal basis for the "obligation."46
It is interesting to note that during the Southern Rhodesia dispute the
Government of Switzerland, a State not a member of the United Na-
tions, communicated to the Security Council the decision of the Swiss
Federal Council that "for reasons of principle, Switzerland, as a neutral
State, cannot submit to the mandatory sanctions of the United Na-
tions."' 7 Similarly, the Government of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, before it became a member of the United Nations, informed the
Security Council of a number of measures it had adopted in accordance
with those contemplated by Security Council Resolution 217 (1965), "in
spite of the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany is not a member
of the United Nations."4 These two examples illustrate the clear deter-
mination of both States, despite their differing views on the efficacy of
taking part in sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, to make manifest
their belief that they were in no way bound to participate in such sanc-
tions, not being members of the United Nations.
The Security Council appears to have acquiesced in these particular
instances to the views of the States not members, since the views of the
Swiss and Federal Republic Governments were not refuted. Can it be
maintained that other States, though not bound to respect the Charter
as a matter of treaty law, have acquiesced through inaction in its appli-
cation to them in a manner sufficient to bind such States in futuro?
The traditional methods of binding a State to international obliga-
44. 27 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/28, at 7 (1972). See also, S.C. Res. 320, id. at 9.
45. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
46. On 22 May 1973, the Security Council adopted Res. 333, which reiterated the
Council's grave concern that "some States contrary to Security Council resolutions...
and to their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter ... have failed to prevent trade
with the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia," and specifically named South Africa and
Portugal. Since this resolution was directed simply to "States" (rather than "all States"),
and since it further noted the obligations of these States under Charter Article 25, rather
than under Article 2(6), it is concluded that this resolution was also directed only to States
members of the United Nations.
47. 22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Jan.-Mar. 1967, U.N. Doc. S/7781, at 117 (1967).
48. Id. at 93.
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tions, namely ratification, acquiescence, consent or estoppel, all reflect
the difficulty of binding against its will a State to an emergent rule of
customary international law. Even if the principle that all States are
bound to observe and cooperate with United Nations peacekeeping ef-
forts was the sort of rule which creates legal norms, which is certainly
doubtful in the absence of an international legislature, it would be insuf-
ficient to establish a binding precept by the acquiescence of nonmember
States. In order for State practice to produce a rule of international law,
stated the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, the rule "should have been both exclusive and virtually
uniform in the sense of the provision involved."49 Acquiescence will not
suffice without more to supply the extensive and uniform evidence re-
quired. Such is the case here. Opinio juris sine necessitatis is equally
difficult of proof where a compliant State decides to acquiesce out of the
fear of adverse political consequences rather than because of an appre-
hended legal obligation to refrain from action.
Nonetheless, it has been urged that nonmember States may be regu-
lated whenever their conduct interferes with the efforts of the United
Nations to maintain international peace and security5" because, it is
argued, Article 2(6) of the Charter binds all States not as a matter of
treaty law but of customary international law. 1 Passivity in the face of
such a claim does not permit the inference of consent to be drawn, since
opinio juris requires a course of positive action rather than a posture of
negative tolerance to endow the conduct with the binding force of legal
obligation. Opinio juris is quite distinct from that prior acquiescence
which has enabled the right correlative to the obligation to be perfected.
Therefore, a failure to protest is not equivalent to acquiescence in the
emergence of a new customary rule, and thus fails to support a conten-
tion that the Article 2(6) pretension has ripened into a norm of custom-
ary law.2
III
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, the legitimacy of
regional arrangements and agencies (hereinafter "arrangements") is
recognized as uncompromised by the Charter itself so long as measures
dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security taken
49. [1969] I.C.J. 3, 43.
50. FALK, supra note 6, at 207.
51. Id. at 215.
52. See also MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence In International Law, 31 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 143, 151 (1954).
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thereunder are appropriate for regional action and consistent with the
principles and purposes of the Charter.53 The Security Council, in appro-
priate cases, is itself obliged to employ such regional arrangements for
enforcement action under its authority. 4 The balance of this paper will
explore the various conjunctions of circumstance which suggest ways in
which obligations arise for States not members of these regional arrange-
ments. The analysis must consider the following classes of States which
may be constrained by the implementation of Chapter VIII enforcement
action: States which are members of both the United Nations and a
regional arrangement, States members of the United Nations but not of
a regional arrangement, States members of a regional arrangement but
not the United Nations, and States not members of either the United
Nations or a regional arrangement.
A. STATES MEMBERS OF BOTH THE UNITED NATIONS AND A REGIONAL
ARRANGEMENT
In order to see what obligations may exist for States not contempora-
neously members of both the United Nations and a regional arrange-
ment through which enforcement action is taken, it is first necessary to
briefly describe the obligations for States possessing such dual member-
ship under Chapter VIII of the Charter. It is not in dispute that such
States become obligated by a decision in which they participate to ob-
serve the authority of the Security Council. The question, however, is
whether a State which dissents from the decision of the regional arrange-
ment to take enforcement action authorized by the Security Council is
bound to accept an enforcement duty." There seems to be no reason in
the Charter why such action, or indeed a request to the Security Council
to authorize such action, need be based on the unanimity of all States
members of the regional arrangement. Of course, the internal rules of
the arrangement may require such unanimity; but once the request is
made and authorized, all States members of both the arrangement and
of the United Nations will be closely bound in law to observe it. This
conclusion is compelled when it is recalled that the decision to authorize
collective action will inevitably be taken by the Security Council under
Charter Article 25. And despite the controversy concerning interpreta-
53. U.N. CHARTER art. 52.
54. Id. art. 53, para. 1. See note 99 supra.
55. Although the authorization of regional enforcement action presumably may involve
two separate votes by the members of the regional arrangement, i.e., one on the substan-
tive resolution and another to seek authorization by the Security Council, it is assumed
that the integrity of dissent is not compromised. Therefore, the result will be Security
Council authorization of regional enforcement action in which not all members of the
regional arrangement concur.
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tion of this article in the past,5" the International Court of Justice in its
Namibia Advisory Opinion definitively stated that all decisions of the
Security Council are binding upon all States members of the United
Nations." Therefore, Article 25 of the Charter binds dissenting States
to observe regional enforcement measures taken by arrangements of
which they are members.
B. NONMEMBERS OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
1. Enforcement Action Under Security Council Authorization
When a member of the United Nations is incidentally affected by
enforcement action taken through a regional arrangement of which it is
not a member, such a State is obliged to observe this action where it is
authorized by the Security Council. Furthermore, it appears that such
enforcement action, if authorized, may be validly directed against a
nonmember of the regional arrangement. Although it is sometimes
argued that the basic purpose of a regional arrangement is to prevent
aggression by its members inter se,58 the Charter itself does not impose
any such limitation, and Kelsen ably demonstrated that Charter Arti-
cles 52 and 53 in no way exclude the possibility'that regional arrange-
ments may provide for enforcement action against States not parties."6
Article 53(1) of the Charter explicitly contemplates such action against
former enemy States, which were, of course, not members of the United
Nations at the time that the Charter was adopted," but the rule of
interpretation embodied in the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius cannot be employed to exclude regional action against States
other than former enemies. Article 53(1) refers to action against enemies
only to free it from the requirement of Security Council authorization,
not to cast it as an exception to the scope of enforcement action which
may be undertaken by a regional arrangement.
When directed by the Security Council, such action is clearly legiti-
mated. 1 The question arises, then, of the extent of such authorization:
56. See, e.g., Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are
Binding under Article 25 of the Charter?, 21 INT. & CoMP. L.Q. 270 (1972).
57. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 53.
58. See, e.g., A. CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 53 (1974); J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS
OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 250 n. 36 (2d rev. imp. 1959), Goodhart; The North Atlantic
Treaty of 1949, 79 RECUEIL DES Couas 187, 208 (1951).
59. Kelsen, Is the North Atlantic Treaty a Regional Arrangement?, 45 AM. J. INT'L L.
162, 165 (1951). See also STONE, supra note 58, at 248 n.29.
60. A specific example of such an arrangement is the Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk,
March 4, 1947, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 (CMD. 7123), 9 U.N.T.S. 187, which explicitly declares
itself to be a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter, directed against
renewal of German aggression.
61. See D. BowErrT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES 305-306 (1964); J. MOORE, LAW AND THE
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Can the Council act ultra vires in this connection? Article 53(1) provides
that the Council "shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional ar-
rangements or agencies for enforcement under its authority," and Arti-
cle 52(1) states that the Charter does not preclude regional arrange-
ments from "dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action
.... " These phrases limit the action only as to place ("where") and
not to time. The key provision is that their legitimacy rests upon "ap-
propriate" action. The Security Council, it may be asserted, possesses
the inherent power to define "appropriate" as a product of its decision
whether or not to authorize enforcement action in any given instance.
And although theoretical definitions of "regional" abound," for present
purposes this functional conception may be accepted as support for the
conclusion that no ultra vires act in this context may be executed by
the Security Council. 3
In summary, enforcement action is clearly authorized where directed
by the Security Council against nonmembers, and this is equally true
of enforcement action undertaken by a regional arrangement on the
initiative of its members with the authorization of the Security Council
directed against a State not a member of the arrangement." The valid-
ity of this conclusion depends upon the extent to which authorization
extended under Article 53(1) to the enforcement action taken by the
regional arrangement is based upon a decision of the Security Council
taken under Charter Article 25. When such authorization flows from
Article 25, the regional arrangement will in effect function as a subsidi-
ary organ of the Security Council. When a regional arrangement at-
tempts to take unauthorized enforcement action, however, Charter Arti-
cle 2(4) will likely be violated, as the next section will show.
2. Unauthorized Regional Action and Article 2(4)
In ratifying the Charter, members of the United Nations have ac-
cepted that they may become subjects and objects of regional enforce-
ment action. Some publicists have gone so far as to state that in accept-
ing membership of the United Nations, a State which is located within
INDO-CHINA WAR 341 (1972); A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS JR., THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES 276 (1963).
62. See, e.g., the test suggested by F.V. Garcia-Amador to the Sub-Committee on
International Cooperation in the Political Field to the Interim Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 18/114, para. 19, in 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
14, U.N. Doc. A/1388, at 34-35 (1950).
63. But see Fawcett, Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia, 41 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L.
103, 118-21 (1965-66).
64. Akehurst, Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, with Special Reference to the
Organization of American States, 42 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 175, 221 (1967).
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a region where a regional arrangement exists but to which it does not
belong has indirectly given its consent in advance to intervention by this
arrangement into regional matters relating to the maintenance of peace
and security. 5 This view is surely incorrect; no regional enforcement
action may be taken against a nonmember of the arrangement without
the authorization of the Security Council. 6
In the case of the 1962 blockade of Cuba by the United States, 7
undertaken by the authority of a resolution of the Council of the Organi-
zation of American States, 8 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was
directly affected when one of its vessels was stopped by a ship of the
United States Navy on blockade patrol. 9 Before this interdiction had
taken place, the U.S.S.R. protested against the quarantine to the Secu-
rity Council." The blockade, generally agreed to have constituted a
threat contemplating the use of force,71 was effectively directed against
the political independence of States not members of the O.A.S. to enjoy
their rights to freely navigate the high seas in time of peace.72
This action was clearly inconsistent with Article 2(4) of the Charter,
in that it involved the threat of the use of force against the political
independence of several States; the action failed to come under either
of the recognized exceptions to Article 2(4) in that it was purposely not
characterized as a measure taken in collective self-defense under
Charter Article 51 and was not authorized as regional enforcement ac-
tion under Article 53(1) .1
65. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 61, at 276.
66. BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 669 n.4.
67. See Pres. Prol. No. 3504, 3 C.F.R. 232 (Supp. 1964), 50 App. U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
68. 17 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Oct.-Dec. 1962, U.N. Doc. S/5193, at 161 (1962).
69. D. WAT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1962 at 64 (1970).
70. 17 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Oct.-Dec. 1962, U.N. Doc. S/5186, at 149. The Government
of Sweden likewise protested to the United States; Washington Post, Oct. 27, 1962, at A6.
See also Wilson, International Law and the United States Cuban Quarantine of 1962, 7
J. INTER-AM. STUDIES 485, 486 (1965).
71. See, e.g., Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515, 523
(1963).
72. See Akehurst, supra note 64, at 199-203; Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, [1963]
PRoc. Am. Soc. INT'L L. 9-10; and the remarks of the Romanian representative in the
Security Council on 24 October 1962, 17 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1023, at 14.
73. As a victim of unauthorized regional enforcement action, the U.S.S.R. in this in-
stance would have been legally justified in taking proportionate measures in the exercise
of its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter had the enforcement action
escalated to the level of armed attack. Since the Security Council was never asked to
consider, much less act upon, the O.A.S. resolution, supra note 68, it seems pointless to
argue that the Council implicitly authorized action taken under the resolution through
its own inaction as did, e.g., Meeker, supra note 71, at 522. See further, 17 U.N. SCOR,
1022d-1025th mtgs. and the draft resolutions submitted by the U.S.A. (S/5187, U.N. Doc.
S/PV. 1022, at 16-17), the U.S.S.R. (S/5187, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1022, at 36), and jointly by
Ghana and the United Arab Republic (S/5190, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1024, at 20).
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A commentator has recently written that, since the Cuban question
was essentially a matter between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the vessels of the U.S.S.R. and of
other States not members of the Organization of American States were
in no way subject to the authority of that arrangement and that there-
fore this affair was "probably" not contemplated by Chapter VII of the
Charter. 4 This observation, however, is less than helpful; it must be
stressed that such States not members are never subject to the authority
of regional arrangements under Chapter VIII, for the reason that when
authorization is given by the Security Council to a regional arrangement
to undertake enforcement action, the action is taken on the sole and
exclusive authority of the Security Council.75
When the enforcement action is authorized by the Security Council,
on the other hand, the State not a member of the concerned regional
arrangement is not only bound by Article 25 of the Charter to accept
the validity of such enforcement action, but is also prohibited from
employing measures of self-defense when itself affected by such enforce-
ment action. Article 51 specifically states that the right to self-defense
is foreclosed if the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security; authorization of enforce-
ment action by a regional arrangement is manifestly such a measure.
Therefore, in the 1962 Cuban situation, if the blockade taken under the
resolution of the Organization of American States had been authorized
by the Security Council, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a
member of the United Nations and nonmember of the regional arrange-
ment would have been obligated to submit peacefully to the blockade.
The power to bring about such a result must be regarded as one of the
principal inducements for regional arrangements to seek authorization
of their enforcement measures by the Security Council.
Another example of regional activity which may conflict with Article
2(4) has been provided by certain undertakings of the Organization of
African Unity (O.A.U.). Among the purposes of the Organization is the
defense of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of
African states;" its Charter declares that it is founded to "eradicate all
forms of colonialism from the continent of Africa" and is dedicated to
"the total emancipation of the African territories which are still depen-
dent."77 Although this Charter does not fully obligate the members of
the Organization to take any such positive action,7" it is appropriate to
74. Henkin, Comment, in CHAYES, supra note 5, at 150.
75. With the exception of action directed against enemy States. See note 60 supra and
accompanying text.
76. Art. 2(1)(c), 1963 Journal Officiel (Gabon) 524, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, at 72 (1963).
77. Arts. 2(1)(d) and 3(6), id. at 72, 74.
78. Art. 3(1) and (2), id. at 74.
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ask if this language could be used as a justification for the adoption of
a policy of enforcement action sponsored by the O.A.U. and directed
against the governments of dependent territories on the African conti-
nent.79 Strictly in terms of compliance with the O.A.U. Charter such a
plan of enforcement action might be fully justified; but, as has been
noted above, the use of armed force by a State member of the United
Nations against the political independence or territorial integrity of any
State is inconsistent with Charter Article 2(4), except insofar as it may
be characterized as an action taken in self-defense or of enforcement by
a regional arrangement. Although in the past the mere presence of a
colonial power in territory geophysically appearing to properly be part
of another State has often been characterized as an act of continuing
aggression,"° such a presence without more fails to create the conditions
precedent necessary for the exercise of self-defense measures such as
armed attack." Therefore, where formal links between the O.A.U. and
groups of "freedom-fighters" exist, it would not sufficiently legitimate
such action under Chapter VIII for the organization to maintain that the
action was quite consistent with its own constitution or subsequent
resolutions, even those of the United Nations General Assembly.
It may therefore be stated that the members of a regional arrange-
ment cannot, by so constituting themselves, automatically legitimate
any group exercise of power in excess of that already made available by
the United Nations Charter." Therefore, no enforcement action taken
at the behest of and in conformity with the mandatory or permissive
provisions of the constitution of a regional arrangement, 3 which other-
wise is in breach of the provisions of Charter Article 2(4), can be justified
as such without the authorization of the Security Council.
79. Indeed, the O.A.U. in 1963 adopted a plan of economic sanction against the then-
Portuguese governments of certain African territories, O.A.U. Doc. CIAS/Plen. 2/Rev. 2
(1963), and in 1964 it called upon African nationalist movements to intensify their struggle
against Portuguese domination. O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res. 9(1) (1964).
80. Cf. remarks by the Indian representative in the Security Council during the debate
on the Goa question, 18 December 1961, 16 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 987, at 10-11.
81. For a detailed supportive analysis, see Dugard, The Organization of African Unity
and Colonialism: an Inquiry into the Plea of Self-defence as a Justification for the Use of
Force in the Eradication of Colonialism, 16 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 157 (1967).
82. See the statement of the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State,
concerning the Legal Basis for the Quarantine of Cuba, quoted in CHAYES, supra note 58,
at 145. The O.A.U. Charter in article 2(1)(e), supra note 76, at 72, contemplates that its
actions should conform to the U.N. Charter; see Elias, The Charter of the Organization
of African Unity, 59 Am. J. INT'L L. 243, 247 (1965).
83. This distinction, suggested during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, has been widely
discredited. See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 64, at 202-203; Halderman, Regional Enforce-
ment Measures and the United Nations, 52 GEo. L.J. 89, 97-105 (1963).
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C. MEMBERS OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS NOT ALSO UNITED NATIONS
MEMBERS
1. Security Council Authorization and the Effect of Voting Procedures
A nonmember of the United Nations, it is clear, can validly partici-
pate in a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII. Article 52(1) of the
Charter in no way restricts such membership to United Nations mem-
bers, merely requiring arrangements which do exist to deal "with such
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security
as are appropriate for regional action" in a manner consistent with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations. The fact that Article
52(2) of the Charter imposes a further obligation upon members of the
United Nations entering into regional arrangements to endeavor to set-
tle local disputes pacifically through these arrangements is properly
interpreted as a clarification of the general conclusion rather than a
refutation of it. When enforcement action is taken under a regional
arrangement, a question arises as to how the party not a member of the
United Nations is affected.
Kelsen wrote that such a State becomes a member of the United
Nations "indirectly," through its capacity as a participant in authorized
enforcement action undertaken by a regional arrangement.84 This means
that the obligations of the United Nations nonmember are determined
by the constituent agreement upon which the arrangement is based and
also by the United Nations Charter, the latter obligation arising only
when enforcement action is taken under the authority of the Security
Council. Where a regional arrangement takes such enforcement action,
a nonmember of the United Nations party to the arrangement becomes
bound to execute measures of enforcement in strict compliance with the
terms of the authorization granted by the Security Council. This duty
is based upon the consent expressed by the regulated State in seeking
such authorization.
From this, it follows that where the United Nations nonmember ab-
stains from the request for Security Council authorization it will not be
bound to join in approved enforcement action. 85 But to say this is not
to define the controlling issue. The obligations of States not members
of the United Nations, based upon consent, may best be comprehended
in terms of the structure of the regional arrangement. If, for instance,
the arrangement is comprised of both members and nonmembers of the
United Nations, the question becomes largely one of internal voting
84. KELSEN, supra note 17, at 85; see also Akehurst, supra note 64, at 227 n.2; Bebr,
Regional Organizations: A United Nations Problem, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 166, 174 (1955).
85. R. YAKEMTCHOUK, L'O.N.U., LA SECUNrrE REGIONALE ET LE PROBLEME DU REGIONALISME
157 (1955).
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procedure. Where Security Council authorization for enforcement ac-
tion may be sought only by unanimous vote, then obviously all States
will be directly bound by the decision, whether the United Nations
members are in the majority or minority. In cases where only a majority
vote is required, however, the result differs depending upon the compo-
sition of the membership. If the United Nations members are in the
majority they will necessarily be obliged to seek such authorization and
the nonmembers will be forced either to join in the decision and act in
legal conformity with the authorization or abstain from action alto-
gether. But where the United Nations members are a minority, authori-
zation by the Security Council will not be required. Members of both
the United Nations and of the arrangement could not, as a matter of
law, take part in enforcement action of this kind and, as a practical
matter, should abstain until such time as they may be able to force a
change in the modalities of voting within the arrangement. 6
The obligations of States not members of the United Nations to ad-
here to the rigors imposed by the Security Council in authorizing en-
forcement action is consensual insofar as it may be said to arise out of
a desire on the part of such a State, manifested by its membership in a
regional arrangement, to aid in the maintenance of international peace
and security on a regional basis. Since the collective use of force for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace is one of the purposes of
the United Nations, 7 it constitutes an exception to the Article 2(4)
customary norm which prohibits the threat or use of force against the
independence or territorial integrity of any State. Enforcement action
by a regional arrangement which is unauthorized by the Security Coun-
cil, however, would necessarily constitute a breach of this norm for
member States of the United Nations.
Moreover, since States cannot act individually in breach of Article
2(4), they cannot do so in concert with others. This does not mean,
however, that there is no basis for collective enforcement action by
nonmember States. The Article 2(4) customary norm is not a principle
unique to the Charter or to the organization created thereby. The
Charter describes the prohibition against the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State
merely as one example of the many purposes of the United Nations;
another purpose, set out in Article 1(1), is the institution of effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace. It appears from the Charter that these purposes are mutually
exclusive, e.g., that States acting in conformity with one will not be held
86. P. VELLAS, LE REGIONALISME INTERNATIONALE ET L'ORGANIZATION DES NATIONS UNIES
111 (1948).
87. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1(1).
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in breach of the other. In this way, Chapter VIII enforcement measures
do not constitute acts inconsistent with the provisions of Article 2(4).
Therefore, it is concluded that, although Security Council authorization
is not required of regional arrangements in which nonmembers of the
United Nations are a'majority, enforcement action undertaken by them
is nonetheless valid in law where it conforms to the Charter purpose of
an effective collective measure to remove or prevent a threat to the
peace, and may not be regarded as a breach by nonmembers of the
United Nations of the customary law norm embodied in Charter Article
2(4).11
2. The Kuwait Example
The situation in which Kuwait found itself as the result of claims by
Iraq to the entire territory of Kuwait during the years between 1960-1963
affords a useful opportunity to reflect on certain of the above principles.
After much controversy, the United Kingdom and Kuwait had agreed
to the withdrawal of a British protecting force from Kuwaiti territory in
1961.89 At its 35th Extra Session in July 1961, the Council of the League
of Arab States agreed to safeguard Kuwaiti independence and Kuwait
was admitted to membership of the League on 20 July 1961." An Arab
defense force constituted under League auspices arrived in Kuwait on
10 September 1961 in response to a request by the Kuwaiti Government;
the force was sent for the express purpose of protecting the independ-
ence of Kuwait."
Since Kuwait was not admitted to United Nations membership until
14 May 1963,92 its position during this period can be determined by the
above analysis. A State which joins a regional arrangement in which
United Nations members are a majority must be aware that no valid
regional enforcement action may be undertaken without Security
Council authorization. In the absence of such authorization, therefore,
the State must be aware that such action will likely be illegal and a
proper subject of legitimate response. In the case of the Arab League
guarantee of Kuwaiti independence, Chapter VIII was not necessarily
contemplated as a basis for action, since Article 51 of the Charter justi-
fies collective self-defense measures taken in response to armed attack.
88. Cf. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 126
(1961).
89. See Exchange of Notes between United Kingdom and Kuwait, June 19, 1961, Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 93 (CMND. 1518), 399 U.N.T.S. 239.
90. R. MAcDONALD, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES 367 (1965); Shwadran, The Kuwait
Incident, 13 MIDDLE EASTERN AFF. 43, 49 (1962).
91. Shwadran, supra note 90, at 49.
92. G.A. Res. 1872, U.N. GAOR, 4th Spec. Sess., Supp. 1, U.N. Doc. A/5541, at 7.
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But the government of Kuwait must have been aware that although it
may not itself have been bound to forego such measures as a pre-
emptive attack upon Iraqi forces, the League of Arab States could not
act in this way in the absence of Security Council authorization. 3
Had the League attempted to effect unauthorized enforcement mea-
sures nevertheless, the forces of the League, including those of Kuwait,
could legally have been opposed by Iraq acting in accordance with Arti-
cle 51 of the Charter. Iraq would have been under no obligation to
terminate its opposition until called upon to do so in conformity with
necessary measures taken by the Security Council to maintain
international peace and security, failing which an Iraqi occupation of
Kuwait might well have resulted. Clearly, this situation would have
been fraught with potentially gross disadvantages, including the possi-
ble political extinction of Kuwait, and affords an illustration of the
practical nature of the constraints imposed upon the freedom of action
of a United Nations nonmember of its relations with member States.
Members of the United Nations are bound in their membership of re-
gional arrangements to respect the provisions of Charter Chapter VIII
with regard to the application of enforcement action against any State,
whether or not a member of the United Nations, and this broad obliga-
tion narrows the freedom of action enjoyed by nonmember States in
their relations with member States. 4
D. NONMEMBER STATES
It has been demonstrated above that as a matter of both conventional
and customary law, third States not members of the United Nations are
not obligated by the Charter. By no means, however, are the activities
of such third States free from Charter influences. For instance, if a
regional arrangement solely composed of States not members of the
United Nations were to be established, it could not profitably be di-
rected against a United Nations member without encouraging that
State to employ Article 51 in opposing that action if it is unauthorized
by the Security Council under Chapter VIII of the Charter. Therefore,
an attempt to employ regional enforcement measures through an ar-
rangement of States not members of the United Nations, although per-
fectly possible in law in accordance with a broad reading of Charter
93. Such preemption is a proper subject for regional action: see Charter Articles 1(1)
and 52(1), the former of which enumerates the taking of effective collective measures for
prevention of threats to the peace as one of the purposes of the United Nations. For the
view that preemption is a right comprehended by the customary norm, see D. BowErr,
SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 188-89 (1958).
94. For a similar result in a different context, see J. GOLD, THE FUND AND NON-MEMBER
STATES 5 (1966).
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Article 52(1), will be doomed to frustration within an international com-
munity composed in the main of United Nations members.
When States not members of the United Nations take regional action
inter se, they do not contravene the Charter." However, such States may
become the subjects of United Nations sanctions if they act to the detri-
ment of United Nations members, and in this way the Charter will
indirectly give rise to positive ramifications affecting States not mem-
bers. Peaceful settlement of resultant disputes may be attempted under
Charter Article 35(1): any member of the United Nations may bring
any dispute, including those wholly between nonmember States, to the
attention of the Security Council. Once the Council considers such a
dispute as an agenda item, according to the International Court of Jus-
tice in the Advisory Opinion concerning the Namibia Question,9" it is
obliged to invite nonmember States party to the dispute to participate
in the discussion in accordance with Article 32. The nonmember State,
by accepting such an invitation, also accepts such conditions precedent
to participation as may be directed by the Council. In practice this has
meant that the nonmember is obliged to accept in advance the obliga-
tions upon member States to settle disputes pacifically under the
Charter, as provided by Article 35.97
If the nonmember State were to ignore or decline the invitation of the
Security Council to "participate" in such a situation, it would run the
clear risk of having measures taken against it by the Security Council
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, based upon a decision reached
by the Council without a full presentation of the nonmember's views.
The question of whether or not armed attack provokes a "dispute" in
the sense employed by the Charter is not of moment here, since any
Security Council invitation would necessarily be predicated upon de-
fined terms for the participation of third States." Therefore, as a matter
95. VELLAS, supra note 86, at 111.
96. [19711 I.C.J. 16, 22. Prior to the Namibia decision, the Court had considered the
question of a nonmember State's obligations upon its acceptance of a Security Council
invitation to discuss an international dispute in the Corfu Channel Case (Preliminary
Objection), [1948] I.C.J. 15. In that case Albania, a nonmember, accepted the Security
Council's invitation to peacefully settle the dispute but disagreed with the United King-
dom's contention that this bound Albania to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court when
the Security Council decided that the Court should settle the dispute. The Court found
on other grounds that Albania had in fact voluntarily accepted the Court's jurisdiction
over this dispute. Id. at 27. In view of the Namibia advisory opinion, it is clear that a
nonmember State today in the position of Albania would be bound by Article 25 to submit
to the jurisdiction of the Court if the Security Council so decided.
97. The Charter clearly does not consider that nonmembers are bound by Article 2(3)
to settle their disputes peacefully, because of its recognition in Article 35(2) that such
States may or may not elect to do so. See generally KELSEN, supra note 1, at 107.
98. See generally remarks by the Guatemalan representative in the Security Council
on 20 June 1954, 9 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 675, at 20 (1954).
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of law, States not members of either the United Nations or of regional
arrangements thereunder are free to settle their international disputes
without reference to the Charter, but once these States take cognizance
of the fact that their dealings with States which are members of the
United Nations are incontrovertibly colored and to a large degree con-
trolled by the Charter, the modalities adopted by these third States for
the settlement of regional disputes must also reflect the rigors of the
Charter.
CONCLUSION
From the above discussion, several principles have emerged which
may be described as rules operable in the sphere of regional mainte-
nance of international peace and security. These principles contain ram-
ifications for third States in various classifications of membership in
international and regional arrangements which are empowered to em-
ploy enforcement action.9 These are:
I. States not members of the United Nations or of a regional arrange-
ment are not legally bound by actions taken through either of these
organizations in the absence of implied consent thereto or the emergence
of relevant Charter articles as customary international law;
I. States not members of regional arrangements are bound to accept
regional enforcement action authorized by the Security Council, unless
such States are also not members of the United Nations;
Ill. States not members of the United Nations are bound to accept
approved action under the Charter undertaken by regional arangements
of which they are members;
IV. States not members of the United Nations compromise a consid-
erable measure of their legal independence whenever they cooperate in
an action designed to maintain international peace and security with or
against a member of the United Nations.
99. The conclusions reached in this paper are not thought to be affected by the dispute
over the interpretation of the term "enforcement action." For a rehearsal of the various
arguments, see, e.g., A. LEVIN, THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN STATES AND THE UNITED
NATIONS: RELATIONS IN THE PEACE AND SECURITY FIELD 52-62 (1974).
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